American Airlines 1420

According to the NTSB (2001), American Airlines 1420 departed from Fort Worth International Airport in Dallas, Texas at 22:40 central time On June 1, 1999. Two pilots and four flight crew members, and 139 passengers were on board and landed at Little Rock at 23:50 central time.
American Airlines Flight 1420 landed at Little Rock National Port in Little Rock, Arkansas. After landing, the airplane crossed the end of the 4R runway and collided with a ground structure. Unfortunately, the captain and 10 passengers were killed. The first officer, flight crew, and 105 passengers were fatally injured in this accident. Possible reasons for the accident were the pilots failed to suspend the approach when strong thunderstorms and related risks exist over the airfield and failed to verify that spoilers were extended after landing. The other factors are poor pilot performance due to human factors, pilot decision-making, and excessive use of reverse thrust (NTSB, 2001)

Analysis

They should have raised the awareness of the crew that pilots may not be possible to
carry on with their approach safely in the thunderstorms. In case the weather forced them to discontinue the approach later, the pilots should have landed at an alternative airport or considered and discussed options such as holding and missed approach (NTSB, 2001)
The initial decision of the pilots to accept the Instrument Landing System(ILS) short
approach to the runway 4R rose the pilots' high workload more by compressing the time available to perform their tasks. Due to inclement weather and high workloads, the 1420 pilots failed to perform the second half of the before-landing checklist properly. As a result, procedure to be confirmed before landing were belatedly implemented or omitted. The captain continued to land despite not meeting certain flight standards. Weather conditions exceeded the company's
maximum crosswind component. The captain should have conducted missed approach on the final approach section. The missing procedures during the approach because of the high workload and pilots' poor performance reduced the probability that the aircraft could land safely (NTSB, 2001).
According to the DC-9 operating manual, when landing on a slippery runway, the pilot shall not exceed the 1.3 Engine Pressure Ratio on the runway when it’s slippery condition excluding in emergencies. But, Flight Data Recorder showed that the reverse thrust surpassed the 1.3 Engine Pressure Ratio many times during the landing phase of the plane. Flight Data Recorder also indicated that the thrust reverser went back to the unlocked state while the plane continued to slide. At this point, it is possible that the captain applied reverse thrust excessively since he noticed that the situation became an emergency (NTSB, 2001) “A survey of USAF pilots and navigators found that 94% had experienced performance degrading effects of fatigue.” (Caldwell & Gilreath, 2002). At the moment of the accident, the captain and the first officer were awake for almost 16 hours. The accident moment was also close to two hours after the pilots’ usual bedtime. The time of the accident coincided with the occurrence of fatigue (NTSB, 2001).

Decision making

Aeronautical decision-making refers to making decisions in a unique environment called aviation. This is a systematic approach to the mental process used by pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given situation. It is to make decisions based on the latest information that the pilot has (Flight Literacy, n.d.). The decision to land is ultimately the pilot's discretion. Unfortunately, the decision was not the right one, leading to a harrowing accident. It is also true that pilots could not get much information to help them make better decisions at that time. However, the wrong decision resulted in an accident in which the jet plane had to slide off the runway in bad weather, and the poorly constructed runway environment resulted in disastrous conclusions. The accident report criticized the pilots' decision to continue the approach to the airport despite severe thunderstorms
in existed vicinity of the airfield. The NTSB also recommended that near-real-time color weather radar displays should be installed to help pilots make decisions in inclement weather (Lewandowski, 2001).

Conclusion
To prevent such accidents from happening again, continuing pilot fatigue management and related research to reduce human factor errors and improve facilities and equipment were required. Much has changed today since the accident occurred in 1999. After the accident, Little Rock Runway 4R had a much longer overrun area. Moreover, the changed crew working hours were implemented after the accident. Furthermore, the weather forecast and radar have improved a lot now (Cloudberg, 2019).

References

Caldwell, J. A. & Gilreath, S. R. (2002). A survey of aircrew fatigue in a sample of U.S.
Army aviation personnel. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12014607/
Cloudberg, A. (2019). The crash of American Airlines flight 1420: Analysis. Medium.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the-crash-of-american-airlines-flight-1420-
analysis-33735cd368a7
Flight Literacy. (n.d.). The history of Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM).
https://www.flightliteracy.com/the-history-of-aeronautical-decision-making-adm/
Lewandowski, B. (2001). Pilot fatigue, error probable causes of '99 Little Rock crash.
CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/10/23/little.rock.crash/index.html
National Transportation Safety Board. (2001). Aviation Accident Report AAR-01-02.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0102.pdf