The crash of Air Florida Flight 90

Overview

Analyzing critically the crash of Air Florida flight 90 is the purpose of this paper.
According to the NTSB (1982), On January 13, 1982, Air Florida Flight 90 crashed into the Potomac shortly after takeoff. Flight 90 was scheduled to fly from Washington National DCA to Tampa TPA to Fort Lauderdale FLL. The plane had 79 passengers, including three infants, five crew members, and 74 passengers. The temperature in Washington was below zero because it was winter. Flight 90 was delayed due to heavy snow and storms at the airport. The flight crew asked ground staff to de-ice the aircraft. But the plane didn't have the ice removed properly. Also, the engine's thrust measurement device was blocked by ice. When the plane was taking off, the engine thrust measuring device was blocked by ice, so the lower indication than the original thrust was delivered to the cockpit, which mistook it for an actual figure. So, the captain put a lower thrust than the normal situation. In this state, the plane flies over the Potomac River and stalls, colliding with the rear of the bridge on 14th Street. The accident killed 70 passengers, four crew members, and four people in the vehicle. “The probable cause of this accident was the flight crews’ failure to use engine anti-ice during ground operation and takeoff, their decision to take off with snow/ice on the airfoil surfaces of the aircraft” (NTSB, 1982).

Unsuitable de-icing procedure

The airplane was deiced by American Airlines employees. Employees applied heated ethylene glycol and aqueous solution once on the left side and did not apply the anti-ice spray. On the right side, hot water was used and then an anti-icing overspray of heated ethylene glycol was used. These procedures were insufficient for de-icing at the temperature at the time and American Airlines employees did not follow their SOPs. In addition, as a result of replacing the nozzle of the de-icing vehicle with a non-standard part, an ethylene glycol solution with a lower concentration than intended was used (NTSB, 1982).

Crew Resource Management

Back in the 1980s, there was no CRM concept in the cockpit, and the captain's authority was strong. According to the NTSB report, the captain has been disciplined in the past for deviating from the company's procedures. He was found not to follow the checklist or procedure. On the day of the accident, the pitot/static cover had to be removed during freezing according to the Air Florida procedure. But the pilots violated it. Moreover, the captain of Flight 90 who is responsible for the proper performance of the de-icing or anti-icing operation before the pushback has never checked the aircraft for snow or ice contamination. Furthermore, the pilots did not operate engine anti-icing devices during ground operations and takeoff. Against the company’s SOPs, the pilots operated reverse thrust to move the airplane from the apron. The pilots deliberately de-icing by placing the airplane near the exhaust of another plane ahead. This is also contrary to the flight manual guidelines, which caused the engine's thrust measurement device to be blocked by ice (NTSB, 1982).
The pilots set the take-off thrust to an indicator of 2.04 EPR based on the EPR gauge, but the Pt2 probe was ice-blocked, the EPR gauge had an error, and a thrust lower than the original take-off thrust was set. Subsequently, the first officer found that there was an abnormality in the engine instrument reading or throttle position during the take-off roll. Although the first officer expressed concerns about the error to the captain several times during takeoff, the captain did not take action to abort take-off (NTSB, 1982).

Conclusion

Florida Airlines Flight 90 crashed due to the pilot's poor decision and non-compliance with procedures. The captain at the time violated company procedures several times. These actions led to fatal accidents. The first officer detected and mentioned the error, but the captain did not take any action. The NTSB cited poor experience in winter jet transportation in snow and ice conditions as one of the causes of the accident. “The crash prompted airlines to adopt strict policies ensuring inexperienced captains are paired with experienced co-pilots” (Kaye, 2009). Because of the pilot's lack of snow experience, this accident would not have occurred if the airline had improved CRM and procedural proficiency by providing flight training in these abnormal conditions to pilots through simulators. Simulator training may also have improved situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, and the captain’s actions may have been taken when FO detected abnormalities during takeoff. This tragic accident is an example of the importance of CRM. The airline industry recognizes the importance of CRM and continues to improve CRM and TEM procedures.

References

Kaye, K. (2009). Air Florida disaster still chilling 27 years later. Sun Sentinel.
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/sfl-mtblog-2009-01-air_florida_disaster_27_years-
story.html
National Transportation Safety Board. (1982). Aircraft accident report : Air Florida, Inc.
Boeing 737-222, N62AF collision with 14th street bridge, near Washington National
Airport, Washington, D.C.. http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-
accident-reports/AAR82-08.pdf